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In September of 2013, the Maryland courts upheld DeWolfe v. Richmond. This 
ruling warrants impoverished defendants to have state-appointed counsel present at their 
initial appearance before a District Court commissioner. Since its implementation, 
funding required to meet the ruling’s stipulations has added to the already high costs of 
the judicial process. 
This paper reviews the history and current state of pretrial release both nationally 
and locally in Maryland. In addition, it investigates the issues related to pretrial detention 
and recommends a policy solution to Governor Hogan along with an analysis of the 
proposal. 
Reviews of case studies and data found that Maryland’s current pretrial laws have 
detrimental financial and social impacts. Many of the issues are related to the state’s use 
of money bonds as a condition of pretrial release.  
It is recommended Governor Hogan adopt a policy that limits the use of money 
bonds, repurposes District Court commissioners to conduct data-driven risk assessments 
to determine defendants’ release, and establishes a statewide pretrial supervision agency 







To:   Governor Larry Hogan 
From:  Christopher F. Massad 
Subject: Pretrial Detention in Maryland 
Date:  May 2, 2015 
 
Action Forcing Event 
On September 25th, 2013, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the January 
4th, 2012, ruling in DeWolfe v. Richmond (the Richmond decision) stating, “An indigent 
defendant is entitled to state-furnished counsel at an initial hearing before a District Court 
commissioner.”1 The first five months of this ruling’s implementation has already 
required a substantial increase in funding.2 One of your leading campaign promises was 
to save Maryland taxpayers $1.75 billion, and corrections is an area in which spending 
should be examined.3 
Statement of the Problem 
The Richmond decision caused former Governor O’Malley to create a council to 
review and reform current pretrial practices.4 The Office of the Public Defender and the 
State’s Attorney’s Office stated they will require $28 and $83 million additional annual 
                                                        
1 DeWolfe v. Richmond, Court of Appeals of Maryland, 434 Md. 444; 76 A.3d 1019; 2013 Md. September 
25, 2013 
2 Governor’s Office of Crime Control & Prevention. Governor’s Commission to Reform Maryland’s 
Pretrial System. Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System Final Report. By Richard Karceski, 
Esq., Annapolis, MD December 19, 2014 
3 Johnson, Jenna, “Fact Check: Would Larry Hogan cut $450 million from school construction?” The 
Washington Post, October 8, 2014, Accessed January 30, 2015 http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-
politics/fact-check-would-larry-hogan-cut-450-million-from-school-construction/ 
4 The Governor’s Commission to Reform Maryland’s Pretrial System, Final Report, Annapolis, MD: The 
Governor’s Office of Crime Control and Prevention, 2014 
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funding, respectively.5 6 Preliminary reports show the increased corrections spending 
associated with the Richmond decision is $2.24 million.7  
In your budget report, you noted Maryland is facing a $1.25 billion deficit over 
the next two years - $423 million in FY 2015 and $802 million in FY 2016.8 More than 
$1.3 billion has been allocated to the Department of Public Safety and Correctional 
Services (DPSCS).9  
In the State of the State Address, you indicated Maryland was set to spend $700 
million more than it expects to collect in revenue. The state’s debt has increased by 96 
percent over the past year.10 Maryland has a budget deficit, and if the Richmond decision 
goes forward as planned it will add to the spending of the State and local jurisdictions. 
A majority of State and county spending on corrections is due to the detention of 
pretrial defendants. Sixty percent of jail populations are those who have not been 
convicted but are awaiting trial.11 In the Baltimore County Detention Center, 91 percent 
of the population is awaiting trial.12 It is estimated to cost approximately $100 per person 
per day in the Detention Center. Using arbitrary numbers, if there are 2,500 individuals in 
                                                        
5 Lauren Kirkwood, “Md. Cute Back on Funding Criminal Defense for Poor.” NBC4 Washington, July 25, 
2014, Accessed January 30, 2015: http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Md-Cut-Back-on-Funding-
Criminal-Defense-for-Poor 
6 Daniel Menefee, “$28M Needed to Comply with Court Ruling, Public Defender Says; Prosecutors say it 
will cost them $83M.” The Maryland Reporter, January 27, 2012, Accessed January 30, 2015:  
7 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
8 Maryland Department of Budget and Management, Maryland Budget Highlights FY 2016. Annapolis, 
MD: Maryland DBM, 2015 
9 Ibid. 
10 The Baltimore Sun, “Transcript of Gov. Larry Hogan’s State of the State Address” The Baltimore Sun, 
February 4, 2015, Accessed February 28, 2015: 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/blog/bs-md-larry-hogan-state-of-state-transcript-
20150204 
11 Justice Policy Institute, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail 
Washington, DC: JPI 2012 
12 Justice Policy Institute, Baltimore Behind Bars: How to Reduce the Jail Population, Save Money and 
Improve Public Safety, Washington, DC: JPI 2010 
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custody on a given day, then 2,275 are on pretrial status, which would cost an estimated 
$227,500 per day on pretrial detention.13 
The inability of being released results in more defendants plea-bargaining in order 
to avoid further detention and longer sentences.14 Of all criminal cases, 95 percent end in 
plea bargains. More than 50 percent of defendants who plead guilty for a lower sentence 
are actually innocent.15  
Pretrial detention hinders defendants’ ability to care for their family, maintain 
employment, and be active participants in their communities.16 The loss of income 
hampers their ability to obtain legal counsel, and being detained limits their access to 
counsel.17 Those who are detained during pretrial and take their case to trial are more 
likely to be convicted, be sentenced to prison instead of put on probation, and receive 
longer sentences than defendants who are released.18 
The money bond system has created the for-profit bail bonding industry. For-
profit bail bondsmen have significant control over the pretrial process and those who use 
their services. They function as a supervising agency for defendants in the community 
due to their power to revoke bond.19 Bail bonding is a multi-billion dollar industry 
backed by giant insurance companies that take advantage of poor communities and have 
                                                        
13 Calculation: 2,500 X 0.91= 2,275 Pretrial Defendants. 
2,275 X 100= $227,500 per day 
14 JPI, Bail Fail 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Richard M. Aborn and Ashley D. Cannon, “Prison: In Jail, But Not Sentenced.” Americas Quarterly, 
Winter 2013, http://www.americasquarterly.org/aborn-prisons 
18 Ibid. 
19 Justice Policy Institute, Bail Reform Update, 2013: Pretrial Services Programs Refined and Expanded 
their Reach, white the Bail Industry Continued to Fight Forfeiture Collection and Non-financial Release, 
Washington, DC: JPI 2013 
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great political power.20 Often times, when a bondsman’s defendant fails to appear in 
court, the court is unable to recover forfeited bonds due to loose regulations heavily 
influenced by bondsmen lobbyists.  
The regular use of money bonds has created a system in which private businesses 
have discretion over who they post a bond for based on profitability, not the likelihood to 
appear in court or the public’s safety.21 The for-profit bond industry does not focus on 
protecting the community or ensuring appearance in court, nor are the bondsmen criminal 
justice professionals trained to supervise defendants.22 
History 
 Pretrial detention in the United States has been through two reforms and is 
currently in a third. To best understand how the current system came to be, it is important 
to understand the laws, policies, and cultural changes that got it here. Before commercial 
bonding the United States operated on a personal surety system.23 
William Blackstone, an influence on the Declaration of Independence, the United 
States Constitution, and common law in America, stated the principles of liberty and 
freedom are directly related to the right of bail for the accused.24 25 He further stated that 
denying release of an accused was considered an offense.26 Since the origins of the 
American colonies, the release of the accused is a fundamental right.  
                                                        
20 Justice Policy Institute, For Better or for Profit: How the Bail Bonding Industry Stands in the way of 
Fair and Effective Pretrial Justice, Washington, DC: JPI 2012 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Surety: Known as a pledge or promise to appear in court 
24 Dennis R. Nolan, “Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of Intellectual 
Impact.” New York Law Review, 51, no. 731 (1976) 731-768 
25 Timothy R. Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail: A Resource Guide of Pretrial Practitioners and a 
Framework for American Pretrial Reform, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice National Institute 




In United States v. Barber, the Supreme Court affirmed that criminal bail is in the 
interest of the public and the accused. The purpose of this is so the latter are not detained 
prior to trial if the government can be assured of their appearance in court.27 Four years 
later, this was confirmed in Hudson v. Parker. Here, the court stated the laws of the U.S. 
were framed on the theory that the accused not, until found guilty, be imprisonment or be 
punished.28  
The above cases built the foundation for pretrial release in the United States. As 
the criminal justice system in America became more formalized and the jails 
overcrowded, sheriffs began using personal sureties to reduce growing jail populations.29 
This established what is known as personal and group sureties. 
Personal and group sureties are a promise given that can be forfeited to the 
government. As the country grew and personal relationships were diluted, fewer 
individuals were willing to take on a personal surety for the accused. Defendants who 
should have been released were now being unnecessarily detained.30 The avoidable 
detainment of defendants led to the commercial surety system. 
By 1898, commercial sureties had become the norm. Bondsmen began charging 
upfront collateral to make profit, resulting in today’s ‘bail enterprise’. This, with a few 
variations, is the model currently used for pretrial release. Money is secured prior to an 
individual’s release as opposed to a promise to forfeit the money on the back end.31  
The first generation of reform to pretrial began in the 1920s. Research of criminal 
justice systems in Cleveland and Chicago found most of the accused lacked 
                                                        
27 United States v. Barber, 140 U.S. 164 (1891)  
28 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895) 





representation, were indigent, and were accepting unfavorable plea-bargains.32 It also 
found bonds were being set based on the alleged offense, not the likelihood to appear, 
and bondsmen were abusing the system for profit.33  
In 1951, the Supreme Court heard its first major case on the issue of bail. In Stack 
v. Boyle, the court ruled setting a bail amount solely on the alleged offense is an arbitrary 
act.34 The court further clarified that bail set at an amount higher than deemed reasonable 
to assure the defendant appears in court is excessive under the eighth amendment.35 This 
case established that, where bail bonds are permitted, there must be an individualized 
determination on the amount set to assure the defendant’s appearance in court.36  
In Carlson v. Landon, the Supreme Court established that the right to bail is not 
absolute in certain circumstances such as capital offenses.37 The ruling allowed for the 
detention of the accused, without the possibility of bail, if the offense is punishable by 
death. It further stated that not allowing bail did not violate the constitution.38 
In 1961, the recurring injustices of the money bail system led the founders of the 
Vera Institute of Justice to implement the Manhattan Bail Project in New York City.39 
The project demonstrated that people with strong ties to the community could be safely 
released from custody without bail on the promise to return to court.40 This became 
known as ‘release on recognizance.’ The program also initiated the use of computerized 
                                                        
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Stack V. Boyle, 343 U.S. 1 (1951) p. 6 
35 Ibid. 
36 Scnacke, Jones, and Brooker, The History of Bail 
37 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. (1952) 
38 Ibid. 





databases of defendants’ case outcomes and statistically based risk assessments.41 The 
program was the centerpiece for Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s National 
Conference on Bail in 1964. 
The purpose of the conference was to promote awareness of unfair bail practices 
and share new methods for managing pretrial release in criminal cases.42 The conference 
led to the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 and local jurisdictions around the country 
establishing their own pretrial release programs.43 
The Bail Reform Act of 1966 was the first major bill since 1789 focused solely on 
bail. It has five major provisions: adopting an attitude in favor of releasing defendants on 
their own recognizance; conditional pretrial release that reduces the risk of failing to 
appear; restrictions on money bonds (which the court could impose only if non-financial 
release options were not enough to assure a defendants appearance); a deposit money 
bond option that allows defendants to post 10 percent of the bond amount in lieu of the 
full monetary amount; and a review of bonds for defendants detained for twenty-four 
hours or more.44 By 1971, thirty-six states passed statutes similar to the act.45  
To incorporate public safety when considering pretrial release, Congress passed 
the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970.  The act 
authorized judicial officers to consider the accused’s potential danger to the community 
when setting conditions of pretrial release.46 It also allowed judicial officers to detain 
                                                        
41 Ibid.  
42 Freed, Daniel J., and Patricia M. Wald. Bail in the United States 1964. 1964. 
43 McElroy, “Introduction to the Manhattan Bail Project” 
44 Scnacke, Jones, and Brooker, The History of Bail 
45 Ibid. 
46 Rauh, Carl S., and Earl J. Silbert. "Criminal Law and Procedure: DC Court Reform and Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1970." American University Law Review. 20 (1970): 252. 
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certain non-capital defendants on the grounds of dangerousness.47 After its passage, local 
jurisdictions followed suit, passing similar standards for determining bail.48 
The 1970s ushered in a new era of bail reform. It focused on heightened public 
concern over criminal acts, specifically those committed by individuals released on bond. 
Publicized violent crimes committed by those defendants fueled a growing dissatisfaction 
with the system. The main targets were standards that did not permit judges to consider 
danger to the community when determining bail.49  
As a response, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984, chapter one of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.50 This act amended the 1966 Act to include 
consideration of danger in order to address public safety. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 
mandated the release of the accused unless the judicial officer determines it will not 
assure their appearance in court or it will endanger the safety of the community.51 The act 
further states that if the judicial officer finds no condition or combination of conditions 
will assure the appearance or safety of community, they may order detention until trial.52  
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the 1984 Act. Salerno 
contested that the act violated the 5th and 8th amendments.53 The court concluded that the 
regulatory purpose of the act and the procedural protections it offers makes it not facially 
invalid under the due process clause.54 As far as the 8th amendment is concerned, 
                                                        
47 Ibid. 
48 Schnacke, Fundamentals of Bail 
49 Scnacke, Jones, and Brooker, The History of Bail 
50 Ibid. 
51 18 U.S. Code Sections 3141-3156 
52 Ibid. 




specifically the bail clause, nothing in the text limits the government to consider only 
flight of a defendant.55  
Issues of jail overcrowding, corruption of bond enterprises, and the negative 
impacts associated with pretrial detention have led to the reforms of the past twenty plus 
years.56 The current generation is using more relevant research than ever before to reform 
pretrial detention. At their core, these reforms look to implement a lawful bail/no bail 
dichotomy, lawfully achieve the release and mitigation of pretrial risk of defendants, and 
replace the money-based system with empirically measured risk.57 
Maryland’s Current Pretrial System 
Until 1971, the Maryland judiciary system consisted of local justices of peace, 
magistrates, and the People’s Courts. Between 1939 and 1971, magistrates served as 
notaries, arresting individuals, issuing criminal warrants, setting bail or collateral, and 
committing defendants to jail.58 In 1971, a constitutional amendment repurposed judges 
in the People’s and Municipal courts to District Court judges and established District 
Court commissioners. 59 60 
Commissioners are allowed to exercise power in respect to warrants of arrest, 
terms of pretrial release pending hearings, and the issuance of civil peace and protective 
orders.61 In accordance with Maryland laws on pretrial release, commissioners are 
viewed as judicial officers.62 Upon being served a warrant or charging document(s), 
                                                        
55 Ibid. 
56 Scnacke, Jones, and Brooker, The History of Bail 
57 Ibid. 
58 Maryland Department of Legislative Services, Office of Policy Analysis, The District Court 
Commissioner, Annapolis, MD: OPA 2013 
59 Maryland Constitution Article IV, Part VI 
60 Maryland Constitution Article IV, Part VI, Sec 41G 
61 Maryland Constitution Article IV, Part VI, Sec 41G(b)(1)&(2) 
62 Maryland Constitution Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article Section 2-607 
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arrestees need to be presented before a judicial officer of the District Court no later than 
twenty-four hours from arrest.63 
The commissioner has the power to release the defendant on personal 
recognizance or on bond with or without conditions. If they determine there are no 
conditions of release that will ensure appearance in court and/or the safety of the alleged 
victim, another person, and/or the community, they can detain the defendant without 
bail.64 The only instance in which a commissioner is not allowed to release a defendant is 
if the defendant is charged with an offense for which the maximum penalty is death or 
life imprisonment.65 
In determining whether a defendant should be released, the law lists factors that 
should be taken into account.66 It also lays out the types of conditions that can be 
imposed, ranging from supervision, stay away, or no-contact orders amongst other 
options.67 Finally, the conditions of release can require the defendant to post a bail bond 
in a specified amount or percentage of the amount as set by the judicial officer.68  
Anyone denied pretrial release by a commissioner or who for any reason remains 
in custody for twenty-four hours after his or her initial appearance is entitled to see a 
                                                        
63 MD Rule 4-212 (e) 
64 MD Rule 4-216(a)(b) 
65 MD Rule 4-216( C) 
66 MD Rule 4-216 (D) Note: A. the nature of the offense; B. the defendants prior record of appearance at 
court; C. Defendants family ties, employment status and history, financial resources, reputation, character 
and mental condition, length of residence in the community; D. any recommendation of an agency that 
conducts pretrial release investigations; E any recommendation of the State’s Attorney; F. any information 
presented by the defendant or defendant’s counsel; G. Danger of the defendant to alleged victim, another 
person, or the community; H. Danger of the defendant to himself or herself and; I Any other factor bearing 
on the risk of a willful failure to appear and the safety of the community. 
67 MD Rule 4-216 (e)(1) & (2) 
68 MD Rule 4-216 (e)(4) 
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District Court judge.69 At this hearing, the judge reviews the commissioner’s pretrial 
determination and makes appropriate modifications.70  
Previous to the Richmond decision, indigent defendants did not have access to 
representation during their initial appearance.71 The Maryland Public Defender Act states 
“representation shall be provided to an indigent individual in all stages of a proceeding… 
including criminal proceedings, custody, interrogation, bail hearing before a District 
Court or Circuit Court judge, preliminary hearing, arraignment, trial and appeal”.72 
Despite this language, initial appearances were not viewed as a criminal proceeding. 
In 2012, the courts ruled that indigent defendants are entitled to representation at 
an initial appearance.73  The court stated an initial appearance before the commissioner is 
clearly within a criminal proceeding and may result in the defendant’s incarceration.74 
The question left before them was whether or not bail determination was a ‘stage’ of that 
proceeding; they ruled it was.75 
Background 
The Richmond decision has already had a financial impact. In Prince George’s 
County, additional staffing needs have increased overtime costs by $86,000 per month. 76 
Prince George’s County estimates they will need approximately $1 million in FY 2015 
for increased correctional personnel alone.77 From the implementation of the law to 
December 2014 (five months), the added expenses related to Richmond have totaled an 
                                                        
69 MD Rule 4-216 (f)(1) 
70 Ibid. 
71 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final Report  
72 MD Criminal Procedure Article, Section 16, Chapter 204 (b)(2)(i) 
73 DeWolfe v. Richmond 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. 




estimated $2.24 million dollars among all twenty-four Maryland counties and Baltimore 
City.78 
Detaining pretrial defendants in Maryland is expensive. The State spent a 
combined $150 million dollars in 2011 on Baltimore City Detention Center and the 
Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center alone.79 Ninety percent of the Department 
of Public Safety and Correctional Services’ (DPSCS) budget goes to Baltimore’s jails.80 
Roughly 60 percent of jail inmates nationwide are under pretrial detention.81 Over 
the past decade Maryland’s pretrial jail population has ranged from 60 percent to 65 
percent. In 2014 the state had its highest pretrial population despite declining overall jail 
populations.82 There are approximately seven thousand defendants detained in Maryland 
jails awaiting trial for up to thirty-nine days at any given time.83  
In 2014, a study was conducted of Maryland defendants over a two-week period. 
It used a validated risk assessment tool to measure defendant’s risk to be re-arrested 
and/or fail to appear in court.84 The study found that, on average, District Court judges 
and commissioners issue higher bonds to low-risk defendants. Median bond amounts are 
higher for low-risk defendants and lower for moderate and high-risk defendants.85 
                                                        
78 Ibid. 
79 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bar 
80 Ibid. 
81 Minton, Todd, D., and Golinelli, Daniela, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013- Statistical Tables, Washington, 
DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, May 2014 
82 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
83 Ibid. 
84 James Austin, PH.D., and Johnette Peyton, M.D., MPH, Maryland Pretrial Risk Assessment Data 
Collection Study. Washington, DC: The JFA Institute 2014. Note: It measured the level of risk of failing to 
appear or being re-arrested while under pretrial status. They found bonds set by commissioners during 
Initial Appearances had no relationship between risk and the amount of bond set. 
85 Ibid. 
Note:  It measured the level of risk of failing to appear or being re-arrested while under pretrial status. They 
found bonds set by commissioners during Initial Appearances had no relationship between risk and the 
amount of bond set. 
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Overall, there was no relationship between the defendant’s measured risk and the 
commissioners’ and judges’ bond decisions.  
 
Source: James Austin, PH.D., and Johnette Peyton, M.D., MPH, Maryland Pretrial Risk Assessment Data Collection 
Study. Washington, DC: The JFA Institute 2014 
 
Bail decisions are not consistent amongst races. Hispanic and black defendants 
are detained pending trial more often than white defendants.86 As the charts below show, 
white defendants are released more, detained less, and have a lower mean bail amount 
than Hispanics and blacks. White defendants are also more likely to be released without 
having to pay a money bond and are less likely to be held without bail.87 
 
                                                        
86 Justice Policy Institute, Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money for Bail 
Washington, DC: JPI 2012 
87 Stephen Demuth, “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A 

























Source: Stephen Demuth, “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison 
of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees” Criminology 41, No. 3 (2003) 873-907 
 
Those who are detained pending their trial are negatively impacted by their 
detention. They may lose their job or housing, have medical care disrupted, and/or have 
health insurance prematurely stopped. Families are adversely impacted, as children may 
have to move in with another parent or relative, disrupting their education and home 
life.88 
The bail bonding industry is profit-based and not concerned with public safety or 
ensuring appearance in court. It targets high bail cases because they have higher profit 
potential than lower bond cases. This results in low-risk defendants with small bond 
amounts not being released because the potential profit is not great enough for bondsmen. 
Bondsmen rarely repay forfeited bonds as required by law, creating little incentive to find 
and produce the defendant they bonded out.89  
Lobbyists for the bail bonding industry have great influence over the legislature. 
In Ohio, lobbyists pressured the legislature to eliminate a refundable 10 percent deposit if 
                                                        
88 JPI, Bail Fail 
89 National Association of Pretrial Services Agency. “The Truth About Commercial Bail Bonding in 
America.” Advocacy Brief 1, no 1 (2009) NOTE: Capital Bail Bonding Corporation ran up $100 million in 
unpaid bond forfeitures. In California it’s estimated between $100 million and $150 million is owed in 
unpaid bond forfeitures.  
 
 15 
it was made to the court as opposed to a bondsman.90 The basis of the bail bond 
industry’s objection to this is that they would lose potential profits.91  
In Broward County, Florida, the bondsmen’s association hired a lobbyist who 
helped severely restrict the Sheriff’s pretrial services program.92 Bondsmen lobbyists 
have had a similar impact in Maryland. They have been successful in stalling the 
Maryland legislature from adding any restrictions to the bail bond industry.93 
Review of the Current Policy 
The current process varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the same 
foundation applies to each. Newly arrested individuals go through a booking process, an 
initial appearance, and a bond review, and then they are released from or processed into 
custody. Despite differences in the number of arrests, seriousness of offenses, and facility 
organization, every arrest follows a similar process. 
Once arrested by a police officer, the defendant is brought to the central 
processing unit located within the detention center. The individual will be screened for 
medical or mental health conditions that would prevent them from going through the 
process.94 Defendants are then booked in.  This process is done every time an individual 
is arrested, regardless of the frequency.95 
Defendants are then put in a holding cell while waiting to be presented before an 
on-site District Court commissioner for an initial appearance. The commissioner reviews 




93 Harris, Melissa. “In MD., Many get Discount on Bail.” Baltimore Sun, February 20, 2008.  
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-02-20/news/0802200092_1_bondsmen-bail-bondsman 
94 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bars. NOTE: If deemed not able to withstand process due to mental health or 
Medical reason CPU will not accept defendant and arresting officer is responsible for getting the defendant 
proper treatment  
95 Ibid. Note: If more violent or serious off he or she’s DNA is collected through saliva 
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the current charges, factual allegations, potential sentence, criminal history, and the State 
Attorney’s recommendation. No bail determination for an indigent defendant can be 
made without counsel present unless representation is waived.96 
The commissioner has the options of releasing a person without charges, releasing 
on personal recognizance, setting a bond, or detaining without a bond.97 If the individual 
is not immediately released, they are afforded a call to arrange money for bail, arrange a 
pickup when released, or to reach a lawyer.  
If they are not given a bail or can’t afford their bond, they are committed while 
awaiting a bail review hearing before a District Court judge. Pending their bond review, 
the individual is processed into the jail according to that facility’s specific standards and 
procedures. Within twenty-four hours or the next court session, the defendant will appear 
before a reviewing judge via video broadcast. 
The purpose of the bail review hearing is to review bond and conditions set by the 
commissioner. Defendants have an opportunity to obtain and meet with counsel before 
the bond hearing. This review allows the accused, prosecutor, attorney, family of the 
individual, and/or another agency the opportunity to provide information to the presiding 
judge.98  
Another agency includes a pretrial services agency or parole and probation. 
Currently Maryland has eleven pretrial services programs out of its twenty-four 
jurisdictions.99 Pretrial investigators interview defendants to gather and verify 
                                                        
96 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report. 
97 Note: Release without charge is based on the State’s Attorney’s review of the charges and 
recommendation. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Pretrial Justice Institute. Report to the Pretrial Release Subcommittee of the Task Force to Study the 
Laws and Policies Relating to Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants by the Office of the Public 
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information for the bond review. The information gathered includes the defendant’s ties 
to the community, mental health and substance abuse issues, and verified information 
from family members, employers, and community members regarding the defendant. 
Necessity for Change 
Due to the Richmond decision, the current generation of pretrial detention reform, 
and growing scientific evidence on the negative effects of pretrial detention, it is time for 
reform. Recent events have opened the window for changes to Maryland’s fifty-year-old 
judicial process. The State’s recent anticipated budget has the state spending hundreds of 
millions of dollars without matching revenues.100  
As previously stated, Maryland is facing a deficit of $1.25 billion over the next 
two years. Pretrial detention costs counties and the state hundreds of millions of dollars in 
corrections spending.101 102 The Richmond decision mandated appointed attorneys for 
indigent defendants during their initial appearance.103 Projections by the Office of the 
Public Defender and State’s Attorneys Office estimated their offices would need an 
additional $111 million annually to comply with the court’s decision.104 105 After the first 
five months of implementation of Richmond, local jurisdictions are already spending 
more money to comply with the law.106  
More scientific research has been conducted on pretrial detention and commercial 
sureties.  A commission has been formed twice to make recommendations to reform 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Defender. Washington, DC: PJI 2013 
Note: Maryland’s 24 Jurisdictions consist of twenty-three counties plus Baltimore City.  
100 Maryland Department of Budget and Management, Maryland Budget Highlights FY 2016. Annapolis, 
MD: Maryland OBM, 2015 
101 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bars 
102 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
103 DeWolfe v. Richmond 
104 Kirkwood, “Md. Cute Back on Funding Criminal Defense for Poor.” 
105 Menefee, “$28M Needed to Comply with Court Ruling” 
106 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
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pretrial in Maryland.107 108 Both commissions recommended pretrial risk assessment 
investigations be conducted statewide and to invest resources to supervise pretrial 
detainees.  
Both commissions have recommended the sparing use or complete elimination of 
commercial surety as a condition of bail.109 110 National and local research has shown 
pretrial detention is expensive, there is no relationship between the likelihood of court 
appearance and bond amounts, bail bondsmen have an incentive for profit not public 
safety, and the current system does not mitigate risk. 
Key Players 
Delegate Curtis Anderson is important due to his extensive experience in criminal 
justice policy. He is a member of the House Judiciary Committee, Chair of the Criminal 
Justice subcommittee and a member of the Special Committee on Drug and Alcohol 
Abuse.111 He has been on the State Commission on Criminal Sentencing Policy since 
2003 and was a member of the Task Force to Study the Laws and Policies Relating to the 
Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants by the Office of the Public Defender 
from 2012 to 2014.112  
He has introduced or been involved with legislation on topics such as increased 
drug treatment, repeal of parole provisions for non-violent drug offenders, and changing 
                                                        
107 Ibid. 
108 The Abell Foundation, The Pretrial Release Project: Study of Maryland’s Pretrial Release and Bail 
System, Baltimore, MD: The Abell Foundation, 2001 
109 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report. NOTE: Recommendation Four recommends the use of 
secured, financial conditions of pretrial release be completely eliminated 
110 Abell, The Pretrial Release Project. NOTE: Recommendation Five states monetary bail should be used 
sparingly and only when no other condition of release will reasonably assure a defendant’s release.  
111 Maryland State Archives, House of Delegates: Curtis Stovall (Curt) Anderson, Maryland Manual On-
Line: MSA April 09, 2015: http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/06hse/html/msa13208.html 
112 Ibid.  
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sentencing guidelines for low level, felony drug offenders.113 Recently, Delegate 
Anderson has introduced legislation repealing the law that authorizes District Court 
Commissioners to set bond and bail and giving police such authorization in the streets.114  
Former Senator Christopher Shank was appointed Executive Director of your 
Office of Crime Control & Prevention (GOCCP). As a former Republican member of the 
senate he will be crucial to gaining support from republicans in the House of Delegates 
and Senate. He was a member of former Governor O’Malley’s Commission to Reform 
Maryland’s Pretrial System, which recommended major reforms for the current 
system.115 He has four years experience as a member of the senate, was Minority Whip 
from 2014 to 2015, and served as a member of the Judicial Proceedings Committee from 
2011 to 2015.116 
Paul B. DeWolfe was appointed Public Defender of Maryland in 2009. He has 
over thirty-two years experiences working in criminal defense.117 He is currently a 
member of the Board of Directors of the National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and Secretary of the Criminal Law Section Council of Maryland State Bar 
Association. He was a member of former Governor O’Malley’s Commission to Reform 
Maryland’s Pretrial System and played a major role in the Richmond decision.118 119 
                                                        
113 Cole, Kevin, “Report Shows the Racism Behind Drug Sentences,” Law Professor Blogs LL, February 27, 
2007 http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2007/02/report_shows_th.html 
114  Maryland Criminal Procedure §4-101.2, §4-101.3 §4-101, §5-201, & §5-202, 
115 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
116 Maryland State Archives, Governor’s Office of Crime Control & Prevention: Executive Director: 
Christopher B. Shank, Maryland Manual On-Line: MSA April 09, 2015: 
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/08conoff/coord/crime/html/msa02786.html 
117 Ibid. 
118 Maryland Office of the Public Defender, The Public Defender, last modified 2012: 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/AboutOPD/ThePublicDefender.aspx 
119 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final Report  
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Bail bondsmen will be impacted by any reform to the current system. Lobbyist for 
bond insurers have been successful in halting past legislation that restricts or changes 
surety bonds in Maryland.120 Registered lobbyists employed by bail bondsmen in 2014 
include, but are not limited to: Bruce Bereano, Manis Canning & Associates, Gerard E. 
Evans Ltd, and Maryland Bail Bond Association.121  
Brian J. Frank from Lexington National Insurance is one of the key bond insurers. 
His company has sued the district courts for not collecting forfeited bonds from other 
insurers.122 He understands the issues with the current system and offers valuable 
information on practical reform. 
District Court Chief Judge John P. Morrissey and Chair of the Conference of 
Circuit Judges John W. Debelius III’s involvement is crucial.123 124 A change to the 
current bond system could entirely change the judicial proceedings in both district and 
circuit court. Both judges will play an important role in the implementation of these 
changes.  
Acting Director Robert Green from Montgomery County Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation, Mary Lou McDonough from Prince George’s County, 
                                                        
120 NAPSA, “The Truth About Commercial Bail Bonding” 
121 Maryland State Ethics Commission, Regulated Lobbyist: Lobbyist/Employer, Annapolis, MD: Executive 
Department November 13, 2014 
122 George, Justin. “Lawsuit: Maryland District Court Failing to Make Bail Bonds Insurers Pay Up.” 
Baltimore Sun, August 12, 2013.  
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-08-12/news/bs-md-sun-investigates-bail-bonds-
20130812_1_lexington-national-insurance-corp-bond-businesses-bail 
123 Maryland State Archives, District Court of Maryland: Chief Judge: John P. Morrissey, Maryland 
Manual On-Line: MSA April 09, 2015:  
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/32dc/html/msa14354.html 
124 Maryland State Archives, Circuit Courts, Maryland Manual On-Line: MSA April 09, 2015:  
http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/31cc/html/cc.html 
Note: Unlike the District Court, Circuit Court in MD does not have a Chief Justice. Instead it has a 




and Stephen T. Moyer Secretary of the DPSCS must be involved.125 126 127 These are the 
heads of the corrections departments in the three most populated jurisdictions in the 
state.128 129 130 Both Montgomery County and Baltimore City have well-established 
pretrial agencies to model any statewide systems after.131 
President Robert C. Embry Jr. of the Abell Foundation (Abell), Matt Alsdorf 
Director of Criminal Justice for the Laura and John Arnold Foundation (LJAF), 
Executive Director Marc Schindler of the Justice Policy Institute (JPI), and Cherise 
Fanna Burdeen of the Pretrial Justice Institute (PJI) have done extensive research on 
national and Maryland pretrial systems.132 133 134 Abell conducted a study of the current 
system in 2001 and recommended many reforms similar to this memorandum’s 
proposal.135 In 2010, the JPI examined Baltimore jails and made recommendations for 
reform.136 The PJI has provided research and development in the field of pretrial services 
since 1977.137 These organizations are imperative to collecting and analyzing data to 
make appropriate reforms.  
Policy Proposal 
                                                        
125 Montgomery County, Maryland, Department of Correction and Rehabilitation: Contact Us, last 
modified 2015: http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/cor/contactus.html 
126 Prince George’s County, Maryland, Corrections>About>Director’s Office, last modified 2013: 
http://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/sites/Corrections/About/DirectorOffice/Pages/default.aspx 
127 Maryland.gov Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services, DPSCS Staff Biographies, last 
modified 2015: http://www.dpscs.state.md.us/about/bios.shtml 
128 Maryland State Archives, Maryland At A Glance Population, Counties & Cities, last modified April 14, 
2015: http://msa.maryland.gov/msa/mdmanual/01glance/html/pop.html# 
129 Ibid. 
130 Justice Policy Institute, Bailing on Baltimore: Voices from the Front Lines of the Justice System, 
Washington, DC: JPI 2012 
131 Austin and Peyton, Maryland Pretrial Risk Assessment Data Collection Study. 
132 The Abell Foundation, Our Staff, last modified 2014: http://www.abell.org/our-staff 
133 Laura and John Arnold Foundation, Our Team: Matt Alsdorf, last modified 2015: 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/node/1#alsdorf 
134 Pretrial Justice Institute, PJI Staff, last modified 2014: http://www.pretrial.org/about/staff/ 
135 Abell, The Pretrial Release Project 
136 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bars 
137 Pretrial Justice Institute, About PJI, last Modified 2014L http://www.pretrial.org/about/ 
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You will request that House of Delegate Curtis Anderson introduce legislation 
titled “Reforming Pretrial Detention Act” during the next session. The goal of this act 
will be to repeal and amend the current Maryland pretrial release laws. The purpose of 
legislation will be to repurpose commissioners to do risk assessments on defendants prior 
to their initial appearance, restrict the use of commercial sureties as a condition of release, 
and to place released defendants under some level of pretrial supervision.  
The Act will amend Maryland Rule 4-213 to include “District Commissioner’s 
shall, except when impracticable, interview any person detained pursuant to law or 
charged with an offense in the state of Maryland who is to appear before a judicial officer 
for pretrial release.”138 “The interviewer shall seek verification of information, secure any 
such person’s prior criminal record, and prepare a written report of the information for 
submission to the appropriate judicial officer so they may decide whether such person 
should be released or detained under any conditions specified in MD Rule 4-216 
(e)(1),(2),(3), and (4).139  
Rule 4-216 d (1) (D) will be amended to state “in determining whether a 
defendant should be released and the conditions of release, the judicial officer shall take 
into account the following information to the extent it is available: any recommendation 
of an agency that conducts pretrial release investigation based on an empirically 
developed risk assessment instrument designed to improve pretrial release decisions by 
providing to the court information that classifies a person based upon predicted level of 
risk of pretrial failure”.140 141 142 
                                                        
138 District of Columbia Code Section 23-1303 (a) 
139 Ibid. 
140 MD. Rule 4-216 (1) (D) 
141 Colorado Statutes Section 16-4-103 (3)(b) 
 
 23 
The bill will also repeal MD Rule 4-216 (e)(4) (B), (C), (D), and (E). It will be 
replaced with: “A judicial officer may not impose a financial condition to assure the 
safety of any other person or the community, but may impose such a financial condition 
to reasonably assure the defendants presence at all court proceedings that does not result 
in the preventive detention of the person, except as provided in MD Rule 4-216 (c).”143 
This should be interpreted that every individual has a right to a bond they can meet.144 It 
is intended to limit the use of commercial bonds unless the judicial officer knows the 
defendants can afford the amount and render the use of bail to rare occasions.145 
Repeal MD Rules 4-216 (e) (1) and (2). These will be replaced with “all persons 
released on no surety release, including release on personal recognizance, personal bond, 
nonfinancial conditions, or cash deposit with the clerk magistrate shall be placed under 
the supervision of a probation officer, another appropriate public official, or organization 
that agrees to supervise the defendant and assist in ensuring the defendant’s appearance 
in court.”146 “The supervising agency will have various functions to perform for the court, 
individual, and other agencies.”147 
Finally, the legislation will amend Maryland rule 2-607 (c) (2) by adding “a 
commissioner shall…conduct a pretrial investigation and risk assessment to be used in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
142 Austin and Peyton, Maryland Pretrial Risk Assessment Data Collection Study. NOTE: Per 
recommendations of Dr. James Austin and Peyton the state should develop its own risk assessment 
instrument that is validated in relation to Maryland’s own defendant population. It will require a study and 
implementation that would take approximately six months.  
143 DC Code Sec.2 section 23-1321 ( c)(3) 
144 Beaudin, Bruce. “The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons From Five Decades of Innovation and 
Growth,” Case Studies 2, no. 1 (2013). http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/Case percent20Study- 
percent20DC percent20Pretrial percent20Services percent20- percent20PJI percent202009.pdf 
145 Ibid. 
146 DC Code Section 23-1303 (h)(1)  
147 DC Code Section 23-1303 (h) (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) NOTE: The agency shall make reasonable effort 
to give notice of required court appearance to each person released by the court, service as a coordinator for 
other agencies and organizations, assist persons released in securing employment or necessary medical or 
social services, inform judicial officer or other legal parties of failure to comply with pretrial release 
conditions or arrest of released person under supervision, perform such other pretrial functions as needed.  
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determining whether to set bond, commit persons to jail in default of bond, or release the 
on personal recognizance if circumstances warrant”.148 
This reform is a ‘stick’ type of policy. It further regulates the District Court 
Commissioners, mandates the use of a statewide risk assessment tool to determine release, 
regulates the amount of a financial bond, and requires anyone who is released to be on 
some level of community supervision while pending trial.  
New regulations in regards to setting a financial bond as a condition of release 
will drastically change Maryland pretrial release. These regulations are intended to create 
mostly a bail/no bail dichotomy like the pretrial system in Washington, DC.149 The 
requirement of some type of supervision by a pretrial agency for any defendant released 
will require the expansion of and/or creation of current community supervision agencies. 
If such regulations are not followed defendants will have the right to appeal the 
decisions. Anyone who is detained will still be presented before a District court judge 
within twenty-fours hours or the next court session to review the judicial officer’s pretrial 
decision and modify the decision accordingly.150 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
Effectiveness/Efficiency 
This policy will reduce the number of people detained in jail while awaiting trial, 
which saves money that can be redirected towards cost-effective public safety 
strategies.151 In 2013, the DPSCS appropriated $156 million to pretrial detention alone.152 
                                                        
148 MD Courts and Judicial Proceedings Section 2-607(c ) (2) 
149 Beaudin, “Lessons From Five Decades of Innovation and Growth” 
150 MD Rule 4-216 (f) (1) 
151 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bars 
152 Justice Policy Institute, MarylandMonth: Prison Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: JPI 2014 
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That does not include the $83 to $153 per day costs incurred by the twenty-four 
counties.153 
To release an individual until their next court day without supervision would cost 
zero dollars. Defendants released with a condition of pretrial supervision costs an 
estimated $2.50 per day per defendant.154 In Baltimore, moving just 1,000 individuals 
from the detention center to the supervision of a pretrial services program for thirty days 
would save the state approximately $2.92 million per month.155 
Pretrial services programs require relatively small upfront investments and result 
in significant cost savings.156 In 2007, Okaloosa County, Florida’s, jail population was at 
117 percent of capacity.157 In 2008, they reformed their pretrial services program. By 
2011, their jail population dropped to 22 percent below capacity.158 This saved the county 
approximately $27 million annually.159 
Denver, Colorado, operates in a similar manner as this proposal. Their pretrial 
program determines a defendant’s eligibility to be released from jail and provides 
essential information to the courts along with a recommendation to be supervised as a 
condition of the defendant’s release.160 In 2012, the organization saved $999,050 and 
reduced jail bed days by 76,850. 
                                                        
153 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
154 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bars 
155 Ibid. 
156 ABA, Frequently Asked Questions About Pretrial Release Detention Making 
157 Ibid 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. NOTE: Originally the county had planned a $12.5 million expansion to the jail that would have 
cost an addition $3.5 million annually. The expansion of pretrial services negated that expansion and 
addition costs associated with it.   






Locally, Montgomery County’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s 
Pretrial Services Division also operates in a similar manner to this proposal.161 During FY 
2012, the division’s approved operating budget for the assessment and supervision units 
was approximately $2.35 million dollars.162 The assessment unit screened over 7,000 
defendants and the supervision unit supervised 2,904 defendants. The average daily 
caseload of the supervision unit was 511 defendants averaging eighty-two days under 
supervision. 163  This equates to approximately $10 per day per defendant.164  
For comparison, the operating budget for the two jails in Montgomery County 
during the same year was $48.79 million.165 The two facilities’ average daily population 
was approximately 772 inmates.166 Based on this, it cost approximately $185 per day to 
house each inmate.167  
                                                        
161 Ricci Greene Associates, Montgomery County, Maryland Master Facilities Confinement Study, New 
York, NY: RGA 2014 
NOTE: an assessment unit interviews all individuals not released by the commissioner. They make a 
recommendation to a district court judge regarding the defendant’s release. As a condition the defendants 
are released to a pretrial supervision unit that supervises them in the community pending their trial.  
162 Montgomery County Office of Management and Budget, Correction and Rehabilitation FY12 Approved 
Budget Details, Rockville, MD: Office of Management and Budget, 2012 
NOTE: The total operating budget was $5,010,950 for 42.6 work years. The Supervision unit in 2012 
consisted of 14 total work years and the assessment unit of 6 work years with a sum of 20. The expenditure 
per work year = $5,010,950/42.6=$117,627.93. Pretrial detention related work years (20) * $117,627.93 
per work year= $2,352,558.69.  
163 RCA, Montgomery County Facility Confinement Study 
164 $2,352,558 budget/2904 total defendants supervised= $810.10 per defendant. $810.10/82 average days 
under supervision=$9.87 per day per defendant. 
165 Montgomery County OMB, Correction and Rehabilitation FY12 Approved Budget Details 
166 Montgomery County, Maryland Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Daily Population Count, 
Rockville, MD: DOCR March 2015: 
http://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/COR/Resources/Files/ADP/DOCR-Daily-Population-Count-
March-31-2015.pdf 
167 NOTE: Jail cost per day: Total Budget $48,793,640/365 days= $133,681 per day. Daily cost 




Source: Ricci Greene Associates, Montgomery County, Maryland Master Facilities Confinement Study, New York, 
NY: RGA 2014 
Montgomery County, Maryland Department of Correction and Rehabilitation, Daily Population Count, Rockville, MD: 
DOCR March 2015 
Montgomery County Office of Management and Budget, Correction and Rehabilitation FY12 Approved Budget Details, 
Rockville, MD: Office of Management and Budget, 2012 
 
Program budgets for pretrial service agencies across the country are small. In 
2009, 50 percent of program budgets were less than $500,000 annually.168 Nine percent 
were between $500,000 and $800,000 and 11 percent between $800,000 and $1.5 million. 
Twenty-two percent operated with a budget between $1.5 million and $10 million, and 
just 3 percent of programs required over $10 million annually.169  
No new funding will be necessary to interview and investigate defendants’. This 
law repurposes the existing District Court commissioners to conduct investigations and 
use a data-drive risk assessment to determine pretrial release.170 District Court 
commissioners are already trained to perform many of the essential functions required by 
                                                        
168 Pretrial Justice Institute, 2009 Survey of Pretrial Services Programs, Washington, DC: PJI, August 11, 
2009 
169 Ibid.  
170 Note: Administrative Judges have the authority to repurpose them as long as it is in relation to terms of 




this law.171 Maryland laws have already allocated the proper amount of commissioners to 
each jurisdiction to perform these duties.172  
To meet the requirements of this proposal requires community supervision 
agencies to expand to properly manage larger caseloads. This requires more staff, 
supplies, and electronic monitoring equipment. If properly funded and planned, 
community supervision can be an effective response to criminal behavior. Without the 
proper funding for resources, redirecting defendants to existing systems may not 
immediately generate expected cost savings or public safety outcomes.173  
This policy is intended to cut spending on pretrial detention and justice 
reinvestment into community supervision.174 During the transition phase, the state and 
counties will continue to fund those who are already held pending trial while expanding 
current community supervision programs to accommodate those released to supervision 
under the new law. 
  For FY 2015, the allowance for the Maryland Parole and Probation Division, 
Pretrial Release Services Program, and other units responsible for supervising offenders 
under criminal supervision is $98.6 million.175 The agency is underfunded as it is, and the 
addition of pretrial defendants could put significant stress on the agency.  
At any given time, there are 7,000 to 7,500 defendants detained in Maryland jails 
awaiting trial.176 In neighboring Washington D.C. approximately 85 percent of 
                                                        
171 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final Report 
172 Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings, Section 2-607(a)(1) 
173 Vera Institute of Justice, The Potential of Community Corrections to Improve Safety and Reduce 
Incarceration. New York, NY: Vera Institute of Justice, 2013 
174 Ibid. Note: Justice Reinvestment is the promise of reallocation of institutional cost savings to 
community-based treatment, education, and other services at crime prevention or recidivism reduction  
175 Department of Legislative Affairs. Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services Fiscal 2015 
Budget Overview. Annapolis, MD: Office of Policy Analysis 2014 
176 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final Report  
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defendants are released while pending trial.177 If Maryland were to have similar results, 
the DPSCS would be responsible for an additional 5,950 to 6,375 cases added to their 
daily population.178   
The Maryland Division of Parole and Probation has three levels of supervision: 
violence prevention initiative (VPI); sex offenders; and general. Each caseload has an 
ideal average ratio of 30:1, 30-49:1 and 100:1, respectively.179 The agency meets the ratio 
requirements for VPI and sex offender cases; however, between sixteen and eighteen 
jurisdictions operate with caseloads in excess of the 100:1 general ratio.180 The average 
general caseload statewide is 136 cases per agent with two counties consistently 
averaging over 200 cases per agent.181 Without significant increased funding the 
additional caseload for the division could put a major stress on the agency and not have 
the intended cost saving results. 
An alternative to using the Division of Parole and Probation is to create a new 
agency, expand the current Pretrial Release Services of the DPSCS, and/or allow the 
eleven counties with existing pretrial programs the option to use their current systems in 
lieu of a state operated program. Any of these options requires additional funding. 
Currently, the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services’ pretrial 
program supervises 19,000 individuals.182  In FY 2011 their operating budget was 
                                                        
177 Beaudin, “Lessons From Five Decades of Innovation and Growth” 
178 Calculations: 7000 X 0.85= 5,950 & 7500 X 0.85=6,375 
179 Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Division of Parole and Probation 2013 Budget 
Analysis, Annapolis, MD: Md. OBM, 2013 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid. 
182 Maryland State Archives, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services: Division of Pretrial 




approximately $45.5 million to service just Baltimore City.183 Prince George and 
Montgomery County’s pretrial programs, the second and third largest population 
jurisdictions in the state, have operating budgets of $5.6 million and $4.5 million, 
respectively.184 185 Increased resources will be needed for these organizations to 
adequately manage increased cases. This creates funding burdens on both county and 
state governments. 
 Estimates to start a new agency suggest an annual budget for a program that 
screens up to 90,000 individuals to be approximately $10 million.186 This figure varies 
greatly based on what percentage of screened individuals are placed on which level of 
supervision.187  
For comparison purposes, Kentucky has a statewide pretrial services program 
with a $12.75 million operating budget for FY 2015.188 Washington, DC’s Pretrial 
Services Agency had an operating budget of $60.8 million for FY 2015. In 2014, they 
supervised 18,656 defendants.189  
                                                        
183 JPI, Baltimore Behind Bar 
184 Prince George’s County Office of Management and Budget, Department of Corrections FY2015 
Approved Budget, Upper Marlboro, MD: P.G. OMB, 2015. Note: Prince George’s County’s pretrial 
program is under the population management division of the Corrections Department. There are six total 
units under the Population Management Division; Inmate Records, Classification, Billing/Sentenced 
Inmates, Pretrial Services, Case management, and Monitoring Services. There is no specific breakdown of 
which unit is allocated how much funding.  
185 Montgomery County Office of Management and Budget, Correction and Rehabilitation FY15 Approved 
Budget Details, Rockville, MD: Office of Management and Budget, 2015 
186 Policy Justice Institute, Pretrial Services Program Implementation: A Starter Kit. Washington, DC: PJI 
2009 
187 There are cost differences for an organization that has 50% of screened individuals placed under 
supervision versus 25%.  
188 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
189 Pretrial Services Agency for the District of Columbia, Congressional Budget Justification and 
Performance Budget Request Fiscal year 2016, Washington, DC: PSA 2015 
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In 2009, Pretrial Services in Broward County, Florida, had an operating budget of 
approximately $6 million for a total of fifty-six staff members. They supervised 5,582 
individuals that year, and 4,095 were released without having to pay a bond.190 
Towson University’s Regional Economic Studies Institute conducted a study to 
estimate the cost of a statewide pretrial program in Maryland. They reviewed the 
potential of establishing a state pretrial services agency and expanding Baltimore City’s 
Pretrial Service program. They estimated the annual costs for the program range between 
$102 million and $300 million annually.191 
A statewide pretrial services will cost taxpayer money. The current system offers 
a free guarantee of the defendant’s appearance to court.192 Money bonds and bondsmen 
save taxpayer dollars by requiring defendants to pay personal money to ensure their 
appearance in court. This policy will require government funding to measure risk and 
supervise defendants pending court trial. 
Equity 
This policy requires the use of scientific methods in measuring defendants’ 
likelihood of appearing in court and being re-arrested using a risk assessment tool. The 
current law establishes what a judicial officer can take into account when determining 
pretrial release.193 However, it is subjective, and judicial officials do not have the benefit 
                                                        
190 Broward County, Florida.  Evaluation of the Pretrial Services Program Administers by the Broward 
Sheriff’s Officer, Broward County, FL: Office of the County Auditor, 2009. 
191 Irani, Daraius, Ph.D., Frye, Raquel, and Jones, Zachary, “Estimating the Cost of the Maryland Pretrial 
Release Services Program,” Towson, MD: Regional Economic Studies Institute Towson University, March 
11, 2014 
192 Montopoli, Brian, “Is the U.S. Bail System Unfair?” CBSNews, February 8, 2013: 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/is-the-us-bail-system-unfair/2/ 
193 MD Rule 4-215 (d)(1)(A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, and I) 
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of data-driven objective assessments of the risks defendants pose.194 As noted, the current 
system has led to disparities in release, detainment, and bond amounts amongst races.195 
Research also shows defendants deemed high-risk and/or violent are released more than 
those who are low-risk.196  
This law requires a risk assessment tool be developed and implemented statewide. 
It needs to be tested and validated on Maryland’s population.197 It will ensure that every 
defendant’s likelihood to appear or be re-arrested is objectively measured. This 
information is one of the main considerations in determining defendants’ release.   
Risk assessment tools are not a guarantee and there isn’t always enough 
information available to accurately measure risk. An example is if an individual is 
arrested for the first time. The defendant has never been in the community while pending 
trial, convicted of an offense, or had court dates to fail to appear to. Without this 
information it becomes harder to measure an individuals’ risk, putting more reliance on 




                                                        
194 Laura & John Arnold Foundation, Developing a National Model for Pretrial Risk Assessment. Houston, 
TX: LJAF 2013 
195 Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial Release 
196 LJAF, Developing a National Model for Pretrial 
197 Austin and Peyton, Maryland Pretrial Risk Assessment Data Collection Study. NOTE: The tool is used 
identify screening factors that are statistically associated likelihood to fail to appear and/or re-arrest while 
under Pretrial Supervision.  Scoring Items (independent variables) are tested to see which ones have the 
strongest relationship to FTA and re-arrest in Maryland.  
Validation research creates a cohort of released defendants. Potential risk factors and FTA/re-arrest data are 
collected and an analysis is performed to determine which set of variables perform best in identifying risk 
level of released defendants in Maryland. 




The principles of freedom and liberty in the U.S. are directly related to pretrial 
detention.199 However, over one hundred years after the Supreme Court affirmed this in 
the Hudson decision, more than 60 percent of inmates in jail are awaiting trial. 200 201 This 
law releases more individuals pending trial. In neighboring Washington, DC, which has a 
similar policy, 80 percent of arrested defendants are released without money bond. Five 
percent are released on a financial bond and 15 percent are detained.202  
Kentucky’s statewide pretrial services program was established in 1976 and 
outlawed commercial bail bonding for profit. Figures show Kentucky Pretrial Services 
releases 74 percent of defendants on average.203 Kentucky’s jails are comprised of only 
43 percent pretrial detainees, compared to 68 percent in Maryland.204 
By maximizing the release of pretrial defendants, the state can ensure as many 
individuals’ liberty and innocence are protected as possible. Those released are able to 
maintain employment, personal relationships, and obtain proper counsel for their 
defense. 205  206  Detained defendants are more likely to be found guilty and receive 
sentences of incarceration over probation. 207  This act increases Maryland’s citizens’ 
liberty and freedom while decreasing the likelihood of them being found guilty and 
incarcerated.  
Some individuals, regardless of measured risk, still fail to appear in court and 
commit new crimes. In Washington, DC, 3 percent of defendants released are re-arrested 
                                                        
199 Nolan, Sir William Blackwell 
200 Hudson v. Parker, 156 U.S. 277 (1895) 
201 LJAF, Developing a National Model for Pretrial 
202 Beaudin, “Lessons From Five Decades of Innovation and Growth” 
203 ABA, Frequently Asked Questions About Pretrial Release Detention Making 
204 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
205 JPI, Bail Fail 
206 Aborn and Cannon, “Prison: In Jail, But Not Sentenced.” 
207 Justice Policy Institute, Finding Direction: Expanding Criminal Justice Options by Considering Policies 
of Other Nations, Washington, DC: JPI 2011 
 
 34 
on new felony charges and 9 percent are arrested on new misdemeanor charges. Twelve 
percent of released defendants fail to appear for court.208  In Kentucky, 8 percent of 
released defendants miss their court date and 7 percent are re-arrested on new charges.209 
Risk tools are not always accurate and even the highest level of supervision can’t prevent 
new criminal activity. 
Technology 
Maryland has nearly 250,000 arrests each year that are processed through twenty-
four local jurisdictions.210 Currently, each jurisdiction utilizes its own jail information 
management system. This makes it virtually impossible for information to follow a 
defendant in and out of different facilities and courts throughout the state. In 2014, the 
GOCCP was awarded a grant to interface local jail systems with the state’s Offender 
Case Management System. 211  This system will achieve greater integration among 
institutional data systems to better track and monitor defendants. 
The new system, along with the Maryland Electronic Courts project, give pretrial 
programs the ability to effectively share information. The State’s vision, as seen below, 
will allow for numerous stakeholders to input and receive information regarding arrests, 
supervision progress, trial outcomes, release conditions, and more.212 
                                                        
208 ABA, Frequently Asked Questions About Pretrial Release Detention Making 
209 Ibid.  
210 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final report  
211 Ibid. 





Source: Maryland Courts, Maryland Electronic Courts: About MDEC: Vision of the Future, last modified 2015: 
http://www.mdcourts.gov/mdec/img/vision-screen.jpg 
 
There is currently no timeline for the implementation of this system.213 If it is not 
running when this law goes into effect judicial officers and criminal justice staff across 
the state will spend unnecessary time tracking and gathering information. Other issues 
facing the implementation of this new system are funding, capacity of current support 
staff to handle implementation, and individual courts’ capacity for change.214 
Electronic monitoring, check-in kiosks, and Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
are an integral part of community supervision. This technology reduces defendant’s risk 
of failure under supervision by 31 percent and has significant impacts on the behavior of 
violent and sex offenders.215 This technology plays an important role in monitoring and 
identifying defendants, ensuring public safety, and reducing the risk of re-offending. 
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Currently, the Maryland DPSCS utilizes each of these tools to assist in the monitoring of 
those under their supervision.216 This reduces the need for new vendors, training, and 
implementation of standard practices. 
The adoption of this law will expand the use of technology to properly monitor 
high-risk defendants. As caseloads grow, the use of this technology also will. This 
requires more staff specialized in the use and troubleshooting of the equipment, larger 
equipment inventories, and training to properly monitor and use the technology. If 
pretrial service programs are not prepared for the technology needs, higher-risk offenders 
could be released without the best possible tools to reduce risk of failure under 
supervision.  
Political Analysis 
During your campaign and tenure in Annapolis you have voiced support for 
rehabilitation and to reduce spending on corrections. On March 19th of this year, you 
announced your backing for the passage of SB 526- the Maryland Second Chance Act of 
2015.217 This bill authorizes individuals with non-violent, misdemeanor criminal records 
to petition the court to shield court and police records after three years.218 You said this 
bill allows “those who meet certain conditions to re-enter the workforce without the 
stigma of criminal background. It is not only the right thing to do but will contribute to 
the economic growth and development of our state.”219 
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You also announced your backing of HB 388, which establishes the Justice 
Reinvestment Coordinating Council under the GOCCP. The purpose of the council is to 
develop a statewide framework of sentencing and corrections policies to reduce the 
State’s incarcerated population, spending on corrections, and to reinvest in strategies for 
specified purposes.220 The council is to use data-driven approaches to achieve these goals 
with reinvestment in strategies that increase public safety and reduce recidivism.221 You 
said “taking a tough stance on crime isn’t just about incarceration. In order to achieve 
lasting results in our criminal justice system, we must strike a balance and explore better, 
smarter options.”222 
Your views towards marijuana are proof you understand the negative impact 
incarceration has on individuals. In response to your stance on the State’s Marijuana laws, 
you said you opposed full legalization of marijuana but believe destroying someone’s 
chances of employment and exposing them to violent offenders in jails seemed unjust.223 
Delegate Anderson has an extensive history in criminal justice reform. During the 
General Assembly’s most recent session, Delegate Anderson introduced or supported 
legislation including; the Second Chance Act, Inmates Life-Imprisonment Parole Reform 
allowing those servicing life terms be paroled, the Marijuana Control and Revenue Act 
repealing criminal prohibitions against the use and possession of marijuana, and the 
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Charge by Summons bill, which allows police to charge defendants via citation and 
release them.224 225 226 227 
His support for reform in this field is reinforced by his career in Maryland. He has 
worked for Pretrial Release Services in Baltimore and practiced law in the state as a 
criminal defense attorney.228 This experience, combined with his leadership as a member 
of the House of Delegates, makes him a key supporter of this bill and its success.  
As a member of former Governor O’Malley’s Pretrial Commission, your Office 
of Crime Control and Prevention taskforce head, Christopher Shank, supported many of 
the recommendations in this policy. They include creating a uniform pretrial services 
agency statewide, funding a risk assessment tool, and repurposing the District Court 
commissioner’s from their current duties to conduct risk assessments.229 
Shank joined the commission in supporting all of the recommendations except for 
one. Executive Director Shank disagreed with Recommendation Four, recommending 
that the use of secured financial conditions of pretrial release be completely eliminated.230 
In his dissent, he stated secured financial bonds, whether in the form of cash, property, or 
surety, serves an important function in the system.231  
                                                        
224 Maryland Second Chance Act of 2015 
225 Maryland 2015 Regular Session, 435th Session of General Assembly, House Bill 303, Delegate 
Anderson, Last Action: February 17, 2015: http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0303F.pdf 
226 Maryland 2015 Regular Session, 435th Session of General Assembly, House Bill 911, Delegate 
Anderson, Last Action: February 13, 2015: http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0911F.pdf 
227 Maryland 2015 Regular Session, 435th Session of General Assembly, House Bill 494, Delegate 
Anderson, Last Action: April 3, 2015:http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/2015RS/bills/hb/hb0494T.pdf 
228 Maryland State Archives, House of Delegates: Curtis Stovall (Curt) Anderson 
229 GOCCP Pretrial Commission, Final Report 




He further argued that when family members, loved ones, or friends put financial 
resources toward a defendant’s release, it is an incentive for them to appear.232 It should 
be noted that Mr. Shank is a former member of the American Legislative Exchange 
Council, a powerful conservative group that has been successful in passing bills that give 
advantages to for-profit bail businesses and restricts or defunds pretrial services 
programs.233 
Other key stakeholders, and/or representatives from their agencies, were also part 
of the Maryland Pretrial Commission. Head Public Defender Paul DeWolfe, Chief Justice 
of District Court John P. Morrisey, Angela Talley from the Pretrial Services Division of 
Montgomery County, Mary Lou McDonough from Prince George’s County Department 
of Corrections, and Wendell France Deputy Secretary to Stephen Moyer of the DPSCS 
were all members of the committee. As previously noted, the commission made 
endorsements in line with this policy.234 None of which, besides Mr. Shank’s, offered a 
dissent for any of the recommendations.  
Abell, JPI, LJAF and PJI have each conducted extensive research on the topic. In 
their 2001 review of the Maryland pretrial detention, Abell recommended pretrial release 
and supervision be statewide, limit the use of cash bonds, and eliminate the use of 
commercial sureties.235 JPI’s 2010 review of Baltimore City’s jail and pretrial system 
recommended developing a mechanism for screening and recommending the release of 
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low-risk offenders using data-driven methods, reforming the bail system to limit cash 
bonds, and increasing the use of pretrial supervision.236  
LJAF has done a significant research on the effects pretrial detention and 
supervision has on defendants.237 They, too, have made recommendations in line with 
this proposal to determine risk, release accordingly, and utilize pretrial supervision.238 PJI 
has been a pioneer in pretrial research. They have documented the history of pretrial in 
the U.S. and given countless proposals on reforming it on the local, state, and federal 
levels.239 
A major opponent of this legislation is the bail bonding industry and its lobbyists. 
The bail bonding industry has donated upwards of $3 million to political campaigns to 
secure support for the industry.240 The industry is estimated to be worth $2 billion 
annually and is supported by approximately thirty insurance companies who employ 
15,000 people.241 Over the past five years, for-profit bail bonding industry lobbyists have 
successfully been able to limit pretrial services agencies and loosen restrictions on 
bondsmen.242 
The American Bail Coalition (ABC) and the American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) are leading advocacy organizations for the bail industry.243 In both 
Florida and Texas, these organizations played a vital role in the passing of legislation that 
restricts pretrial programs to the point where they are not effective.244 They have put 
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pressure on states like Oregon, one of four states outlawing bondsmen, to reestablish for-
profit bail industry.245 
Former judicial leaders and legislative leaders have gone on record regarding the 
power of bondsmen in Maryland. Former District Court Chief Justice Ben Clyburn 
testified at the general assembly about proposals to change the judicial process. He stated 
it wouldn’t be realistic to eliminate money bond in Maryland due to the bondmen’s lobby 
being so powerful.246 He said, “We are very realistic in terms of bail here in Maryland. 
Bail Bondsmen, they have a lobby- a very strong lobby- and there is a reason why they’re 
still here”.247 He suggested the only way to not rely on monetary bond is to give enough 
diversion options to judges to not use money bonds.248 
In early 2013, Lake Research Partners conducted a public opinion research study 
on pretrial risk assessment programs.249 They found that, nationwide, voters support this 
type of reform. Many voters believe that risk-based tools and supervision are already part 
of the pretrial system.250 Seven-in-ten voters nationwide support replacing cash bail 
bonds with risk assessments. Nearly half of voters strongly support it.251 As seen below, 
support crosses many demographics including gender, age, party identification, and 
region. 
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% Support % Strong Report
Margin of Support 
(Support-Oppose)
70% 47% 57
Men 72% 42% 59
Women 67% 44% 56
Under 50 72% 40% 60
Over 50 67% 44% 54
Democrat 74% 41% 64
Independent 66% 44% 52
Republican 69% 46% 56
Northeast 66% 40% 55
Midwest 70% 50% 59
South 69% 48% 55









Source: Celinda Lake, Daniel Gotoff, and Kristy Pultorak.  Support for Risk Assessment Programs Nationwide. 
Washington, DC: Lake Research Partners 2013 
There is nationwide support for pretrial risk assessment reform.252 This eases 
concerns of voter backlash in response to this legislation. Most promising for you is that 
69 percent of Republicans support reform, with 46 percent feeling strongly for it. In the 
northeast and south, voters are 66 percent and 69 percent supportive of reform, 
respectively.253 
During your State of the State Address, you said that Maryland couldn’t continue 
the same path of spending.254 This proposal has potential to decrease corrections 
spending for both the state and counties. Your support of this legislation will further 
prove your dedication adopting new strategies towards crime and incarceration.255 
On March 19th, 2015, you expressed support to establish the Justice Reinvestment 
Coordinating Council.256 As previously mentioned, the focus of this council is to use 
data-driven approaches to reduce spending on corrections and reduce recidivism.257 Your 
                                                        
252 Ibid. 
253 Ibid. 
254 The Baltimore Sun, “Transcript of Gov. Larry Hogan’s State of the State Address” 





support of this proposal can be a key legislation for that council. This proposal creates a 
data-driven risk assessment tool used to release more defendants pending trial. 
This policy could have significant up front costs. They can come in the form of 
expanding the Division of Parole and Probation or Baltimore City’s Pretrial Services 
and/or creating a new pretrial agency. You promised to roll back taxes and proposed a 
handful of tax cuts.258 The support of this policy could require appropriating additional 
funds to meet new requirements set by this proposal.  
The release of more defendants increases the likelihood of pretrial defendants 
committing new offenses while pending trial. In Washington, DC, eleven defendants 
were charged with violent crimes while on GPS monitoring.259 One pretrial defendant, 
Javon Hale, was charged in two shootings and a kidnapping over three days, leaving one 
man dead and two others wounded.260 A DC Superior Court judge stated, “No judge 
wants to release someone and have that person commit a violent crime while on 
release”.261 If this were to happen in Maryland as a result of this legislation, backlash 
would be imminent.  
Bail bondsmen lobbyists are so powerful in Maryland it’s left some weary of the 
State’s ability to eliminate monetary bonds.262 They have been successful at restricting 
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pretrial programs while defeating restrictions on the industry in Florida, North Carolina, 
and Texas.263 It is expected they will lobby against this legislation to the fullest. 
Executive Director Christopher Shank will be one of this policy’s biggest 
opponents. As a member of the Pretrial Commission he dissented against the elimination 
of cash bonds.264 He is also a former member of ALEC, one of the largest, most powerful 
lobbyists for bail bondsmen nationwide.265 His leadership in the Republican Party and in 
your GOCCP makes him a key stakeholder to gain support from.266 
A crucial strategy for this policy’s success is to inform the public and legislators. 
Despite strong public support for pretrial risk assessments, 33 percent of voters believe 
risk assessments are already being used to determine pretrial release.267 268 If voters are 
better informed of Maryland’s current pretrial system, support for these practices would 
grow.269 To do this, you should direct the Justice Reinvestment Coordination Council to 
take necessary steps to move forward with comprehensive pretrial reform.270  
Despite potential new funding needs to create, implement, reorganize, or expand 
to a uniform pretrial release, it is still significantly cheaper than the current system. JPI 
estimates that by releasing just 1,000 individuals from the Baltimore City Detention 
Center to the Pretrial Release Services program has potential savings of $2.92 million per 
month.271  
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Even a pretrial services program with a high operating budget, like DC’s $60.8 
million budget, is less expensive than incarcerating these individuals. Washington, DC’s, 
Pretrial Services Agency supervised 18,656 individuals during 2014.272 In 2011, 
Maryland spent approximately $150 million to operate just two Baltimore City jails.273 It 
will be imperative to focus on the number of defendants pretrial supervision can 
supervise for significantly less money.  
Some pretrial defendants will re-offend regardless. However, LJAF found that 
low-risk defendants who spent two to three days in jail waiting to post a monetary bond 
were 39 percent more likely to be re-arrested while their case was pending than those 
who were released without a bond.274 Regardless of the case outcome, detained low-risk 
pretrial defendants are 27 percent more likely to recidivate within twelve months of 
release.275 Pretrial release is not only less expensive during the pretrial period, but has the 
potential to lower future recidivism.   
Despite eleven defendants committing violent offenses on GPS monitoring, they 
represent only 0.8 percent of the 1,351 total defendants electronically monitored in 
DC.276 Only 8 percent of the 1,351 monitored defendants were re-arrested on new 
charges.277 For DC’s entire pretrial program, 12 percent of the 18,000 plus defendants 
were arrested on new charges. In Kentucky, 7 percent of released defendants are re-
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arrested.278 These re-arrest rates are very low and it is imperative to inform both the 
public and general assembly of these facts. 
Combating lobbyists will one of the biggest obstacles to this policy’s success. An 
important aspect to focus on is this legislation does not eliminate the use of monetary 
bonds. Monetary bonds will still be used and defendants can still utilize bondsmen to 
secure their release. This legislation simply ensures that bonds are set at an amount that 
individuals can afford and that commercial bonds aren’t used to prevent individuals’ 
ability to be released.279  
This law keeps Mr. Shank’s concerns regarding the importance of money bonds 
intact. Family and friends will still be relied upon to secure defendant’s release. Pretrial 
services will need to contact family and friends to verify information along with keeping 
supervising agents up to date on any issues with the defendant while under supervision.  
A counter to Shank and bail bondsmen’s concerns relates to the incentive created 
by posting personal or family funds to secure release. When the family or defendant posts 
a bond through a bondsman, that money is non-refundable.280 Whether they show up or 
not the money is gone. Yes, the bondsmen are supposed to forfeit the rest of the money to 
the courts, however, those forfeited bonds are rarely collected.281 
States can stand up to the bail bonding industry. In 2009, neighboring Virginia 
lawmakers proposed one of ALEC’s Right to Know Acts that would have crippled their 
pretrial program.282 283 After being introduced, the Department of Planning and Budget 
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generated a fiscal impact statement stating the act would have required a significant re-
write of the current system and would cost $1.5 million to implement. By having data 
ready to combat the lobbyists, it is possible to ensure legislators and the public are 
properly informed to make the best decision for Maryland. 
Recommendation 
I recommend you adopt this proposal. Nationwide pretrial release policies are 
being reformed. The Richmond decision has brought the issues with Maryland’s current 
system to the forefront. With tight budgets and an archaic system, it is an ideal time to 
reform Maryland’s system.  
As a state, Maryland is spending a lot of money to detain defendants. Many are 
taken away from their jobs, and separated from family and friends. Their lack of adequate 
funds places the burden on taxpayers to detain them because defendants cannot afford a 
$50 or $100 bond.284 In some jurisdictions, the cost per day to detain these individuals is 
more expensive than the bond amount necessary to be released.  
During your campaign you acknowledged that putting nonviolent offenders in 
jails seems unjust.285 A majority of defendants pending trial are low-risk, nonviolent 
offenders.286 In many cases they are being housed with convicted, violent, high-risk 
offenders.  
By adopting this recommendation Maryland, like Kentucky and DC, will be a 
leader in pretrial release. The use of data-driven risk assessment tools will ensure that 
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every arrestee is measured on the same scale. It allows for the maximum number of 
people to be released back into the community to continue their lives. It better promotes 
the founding principles of our country: innocent until proven guilty.   
The cost to supervise individuals in the community versus detaining them is 
significantly cheaper. Existing pretrial programs in Maryland are spending between $2.50 
and $10 per day per defendant. These figures are much less expensive than the daily cost 
to incarcerate. Not only will citizens be allowed to be contributing members of society, 
but also tax dollars can be reallocated to other sectors such as education.  
This proposal will save Maryland money. Additional funding will be necessary to 
meet the requirements of this law. However, once in effect, jails’ operating budgets will 
decrease. If Maryland were to reduce it’s detained pretrial population to 40 percent, that 
is a 25 percent decrease in jail populations statewide. To supervise that 25 percent on 
pretrial supervision has a price tag only 2 to 5 percent of the cost to detain them.  
Releasing more defendants Maryland will lower the costs of future incarceration. 
Those who are released during pretrial detention are less likely to be sentenced to 
incarceration. Even if they are incarcerated those released during pretrial are more likely 
to have shorter sentences than those who are detained. Released defendants’ chances of 
recidivism are also reduced after their case is disposed. 287 This saves future expenditures 
to arrest, process, supervise, and incarcerate these individuals.  
Maryland’s current system relies on private businesses without criminal justice 
backgrounds to supervise defendants in the community. Bondsmen are making profits off 
of citizens’ freedom. They are allowed to decide whom they accept business from and 
whom they don’t, based on the opportunity of profit, not public safety. This is against the 
                                                        
287 Lowenkamp, VanNostrand, & Holsinger, The Hidden Costs of Pretrial Detention. 
 
 49 
very principles of pretrial release, which is to assure public safety and appearance in 
court. 
By adopting this recommendation, many of the above issues will be addressed. 
Less taxpayer funding will be needed to support correctional facilities. More citizens will 
be able continue being contributing members of society. It will limit the use and/or need 
for for-profit bail bonding agencies that have a stronghold on the system. For those 
reasons, I recommend you adopt this policy proposal and make Maryland a leader in 
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